As I was going through some old Google Reader items that I’d saved (starred, whatever), I came across Jim Goldstein’s article on the U.S. Copyright Office’s Electronic Copyright Office (eCO) beta. I saved this article because I’d intended to sign up, but had heard that there was a significant approval backlog.
I submitted my beta application on 8 Jan, and less than 24 hours later, I am the proud owner of an eCO account!
If you were waiting to enroll, this might just be a good time. Request your very own eCO account here.
Ruth Suehle’s article on intellectual property, trademark and copyright as these concepts relate to photography, points out that “copyright law does protect architecture for buildings built after 1990.” Had no idea. The details can be found in U.S. Copyright Office Circular 41, which spells out the Scope of Protection:
An original design of a building embodied in any tangible medium of expression, including a building, architectural plans, or drawings, is subject to copyright protection as an “architectural work” under Section 102 of the Copyright Act, 17 USC, as amended on December 1, 1990. The work includes the overall form as well as the arrangement and composition of spaces and elements in the design but does not include individual standard features or design elements that are functionally required.
The term building means structures that are habitable by humans and intended to be both permanent and stationary, such as houses and office buildings, and other permanent and stationary structures designed for human occupancy, including but not limited to churches, museums, gazebos, and garden pavilions.
The circular elaborates on those works that cannot be registered, to include dams, bridges and walkways. It also explains in only slightly more detail what is meant by “individual standard features or design elements that are functionally required:”
Standard configurations of spaces, and individual standard features, such as windows, doors, and other staple building components, as well as functional elements whose design or placement is dictated by utilitarian concerns.
So, one could not photograph and sell a picture of a qualified building, but one could do so with pictures of the doors, windows and other oft-photographed features. In a way, this makes sense–photographs of individual features do not capture the whole of the architectural concept. On the other hand, such features are sometimes nearly as well-known as the structures to which they belong.
There’s been a good deal of commentary related to my July complaint. Thanks once more to everyone who weighed in with an opinion, either here or elsewhere. I’ve considered responding to many of the points (and allegations), but I haven’t the time, and in almost every case opposing points of view are already adequately represented in the comments.
That said, one topic that I’m compelled to address is that of “stop and identify” (also referred to as “failure to identify”) laws, particularly those affecting citizens in the D.C. metro area. My aversion to legal proceedings in which I am on the receiving end kicked in during the 3701 incident, and my suspicion that I would be cited or detained for failure to identify was the primary reason that I provided government-issued identification (among other things) and ended up in this situation.
Stop and identify laws require that individuals identify themselves–to varying degrees, and under specific circumstances–when asked to do so by a peace officer. Stop and identify laws are controversial. So much so that a Nevada case from 2000 ended up in the United States Supreme Court (in 2004), where the justices held (5-4) that stop and identify laws do not, in fact, violate an individual’s fourth or fifth amendment rights. You can read more about the case on Papers, Please! (keeping in mind that this site has a stated agenda).
In the comments that follow my original article, Ron Summers indicates that Virginia is not one of the twenty-four states that have enacted a stop and identify law. Shortly thereafter, jetelo states that not only does Virginia have such a law, but that Arlington County has a similar statute all their own. Confused, I decided to do a little digging . . .
According to the list of states with stop and identify statutes compiled by StateMaster (which, incidentally, is a fascinating site) Virginia has no such law on the books. However, if we look at Virginia House Bill 1643, we see that stop and identify-esque verbiage was proposed in 2004 and brought to a vote in January 2005. It appears as though the vote passed, but was “tabled in Courts of Justice.” I’m not sure what that means (as far as the future of the bill is concerned), but as of the date of this writing, it does not appear to have been adopted.
Score: Ron Summers: 1. Jetelo: 0.
Satisfied that no such law appears to be on the books in Virginia, I continued my search to determine the status of stop and identify laws in a handful of D.C. suburbs.
According to Chapter 17, Section 13(c) of the Arlington County Code (”Peace and good order; loitering”): “It shall be unlawful for any person at a public place or place open to the public to refuse to identify himself by name and address at the request of a uniformed police officer or of a properly identified police officer not in uniform, if the surrounding circumstances are such as to indicate to a reasonable man that the public safety requires such identification.” Failure to identify is considered a misdemeanor.
Score: Ron Summers: 1. Jetelo: 1. Tie ball game. Push. Mexican standoff. Moving right along . . .
In the Fairfax County Code, Article 1 (”Offenses Against Public Peace and Safety”), there exists an “Identification” clause in Section 5-1-2(c), but this section is marked as having been “[r]epealed by 24-83-5.” I can find no further documentation related to this repeal code. Call it a win?
Near as I can tell, no such law exists in Washington, D.C. This means that the Park Police might not be able to demand that one identify one’s self. However, the presence of agencies such as the F.B.I, Secret Service, and Coast Guard–and the myriad anti-terrorism directives under which they operate–is a pretty clear indicator that, assuming they’re interested, either one’s name will be obtained or one’s ability to move about the city will be temporarily hindered.
Lastly, I thought I’d check in on Montgomery County, MD, parent county of Silver Spring, home of the now-more-or-less-resolved regional first amendment debacle of the year. The only provision for identification that I can find (Chapter 1-18, sub-section (b)(3)) requires only that individuals identify themselves if they are being issued a citation.
Whether I should have been aware of the these laws and related jurisdictions at the time that I was stopped is now a moot point. But I do feel a little better knowing that I wasn’t just dreaming up a scenario in which I’d be detained or otherwise cited for failing to identify myself to a peace officer. As it turns out, I didn’t need to provide any identification–Arlington County only requires that one provide name and address–proof in the form of goverment-issued identification is not required by the letter of the law. However, the suggestions made by a police officer when one is stopped are often interpreted as law. As a result, an officer suggesting that one provide proof of identification will, far more often than not, be interpreted as a requirement and not a suggestion.